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Abstract 
This paper discusses two interlinked topics: the shifts in the employment relations system and the role of 
unions in the two countries. An initial impression is that there is a growing divergence between the employ-
ment relations systems in the two countries over the last fifteen years. The implementation of free-market 
policies in New Zealand can be contrasted with a more mixed philosophical basis of the Danish refonns. 
However, the paper tries to demonstrate through an analysis of key employment relations regulations that a 
more complex pattern of divergence and convergence exists. 
When it comes to the role of unions, the paper presents a clear-cut divergence pattern. This raises two querstions. 
Why have the Danish unions avoided the widespread decline in unionism? Why has the decline in union 
presence been so marked in New Zealand, and will the unions rebound from this decline? 
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Both New Zealand and Denmark have a small population, 
an industry structure influenced by the traditional strength 
of agriculture and the predominance of small organisations. 
Historically, they have had a well-developed welfare sys-
tem and an extensive public sector. The strong role of the 
state has shaped employment relations in both countries. 
This paper discusses two interlinked topics: the shifts in 
the employment relations system and in the role of unions 
in the 1990's. An initial impression is that there is a grow-
ing divergence between the employment relations systems 
in the two countries. The implementation of free-market 
policies in New Zealand can be contrasted with a more 
mixed philosophical basis of the Danish reforms. However, 
the paper tries to demonstrate through an analysis of em-
ployment relations regulations that a more complex pat-
tern of divergence and convergence exists. 
When it comes to the role of the unions, the paper presents a 
clear-cut divergence pattern. This raises two questions. Why 
has the decline in union presence been so strong in New 
Zealand and why have the Danish unions avoided the wide-
spread decline in unionism? These questions are analysed 
within a theoretical framework proposed by Visser (1991). 
The paper is based on results from our long-term compara-
tive research project which has focussed on the following 
topics: the role of the state, the role of collective action and 
unions, bargaining trends, employee choice and voice, 
changes in working time and work patterns, employment 
and unemployment policies. As this paper is presented to a 
New Zealand audience, it is assumed that the reader will 
be unfamiliar with the Danish employment relations sys-
tem. Thus, the paper will put more emphasis on explaining 
characteristics and trends of the Danish system. 1 
Table 1. Bargaining principles • New Zealand & Denmark in the 1990's 
New Zealand 
Non-prescriptive 
Individual focus 
Sanctity of contract 
Disputes of interest & rights 
Recognition versus bargaining rights 
Minimum conditions 
Personal Grievances 
Denmark 
Non-prescriptive 
Collective focus 
Sanctity of contract 
Disputes of interest & rights 
Neither recognition nor bargaining rights 
Minimum conditions 
Common law for individual grievances 
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Employment relations systems 
In the following, some of the key characteristics of the two 
countries' bargaining frameworks are presented in Table 1. 
The table provides a framework for a discussion of pat-
terns of convergence and divergence. A key argument of 
this paper is that the transformation of New Zealand em-
ployment relations- from the previous conciliation and ar-
bitration system to a deregulated system under the Employ-
ment Contracts Act (ECA) (Rasmussen & Boxall, 1995: 
79-81)- has moved it closer to the Danish system. Table 1 
tends to exaggerate the similarities. However, both simi-
larities and differences will be explored in more detail in 
the following discussion of the key bargaining principles. 
The bargaining scenario in New Zealand 
The bargaining scenario under the ECA can be summa-
rised in the following way. 
The ECAhas been called non-prescriptive or enabling leg-
islation (Rasmussen & Lamm, 1999). This was clearly an 
intentional move to allow employers and employees to 
choose their own bargaining arrangements and outcomes 
(Birch, 1991; Deeks et a!, 1994: 85). The shift to a totally 
different employment relations system also introduced sev-
eral new, undefined terms, which has subsequently allowed 
legal precedent to become a key feature of establishing new 
bargaining rules (Anderson, 1997). 
The individual focus of the ECA is pronounced in its treat-
ment of collective bargaining and unions (see below). In 
particular, the restrictions on multi-employer bargaining-
with direct and secondary strike action in seeking a multi-
employer collective employment contract being deemed 
unlawful - have had negative implications for collective 
bargaining. These restrictions have been heavily criticised 
by the ILO as violating New Zealand's international obli-
gations (Haworth & Hughes, 1995; Novitz, 1996). 
The individual focus goes further, however, than the obvi-
ous restrictions of collective bargaining. The individual 
employer or employee is the key actor under the ECA, with 
other actors being reduced to secondary, agent status. This 
is obvious in terms of personal grievances and it is also 
illustrated by the preference for individual, often written, 
authorisation of union negotiators. As Dannin (1997) points 
out, this is a usual practice amongst OECD countries. In 
essence, the understanding of the Act's two key concepts 
of 'Freedom of Association' and 'Freedom of Choice' is 
based on a individualistic perspective (Rasmussen et al, 
1996). 
The sanctity of contract principle is - together with the prin-
ciples of freedom of association and freedom of choice -
one of the key underlying principles of the ECA. The sanc-
tity of contract has been further strengthened by legal prec-
edent; in particular through several Court of Appeal deci-
sions in 1998 (Rasmussen & Lamm, 1999: 53-58). The no-
tion of sanctity of contract was a prominent underlying prin-
ciple prior to the ECA, as one would expect of the legalis-
tic conciliation and arbitration system (Deeks et al, 1994). 
Nevertheless, this principle was severely challenged under 
the development and debate of the ECA where Treasury 
officials suggested opting-out possibilities similar to 'em-
ployment-at-will' contracts (Walsh & Ryan 1993: 21-22). 
The sanctity of contract notion was endorsed by Parlia-
ment during the 1991 policy debate. It has subsequently 
become more than just an abstract public policy principle: 
it is a key principle in both collective and individual bar-
gaining and it has become part of standard awareness 
amongst employers and employees.2 
The important distinction between disputes of interest and 
disputes of rights has been part of New Zealand bargaining 
since its inclusion in the Industrial Relations Act 1973. This 
inclusion was inspired by American practices. It was an 
important way of containing disputes over contract inter-
pretation and it interacted, therefore, with the contract of 
sanctity principle. While there is no explicit mentioning of 
the distinction between disputes of interest and disputes of 
rights in the ECA, the distinction is clearly contained in 
the dispute procedures stipulated by the Act (Rasmussen & 
Lamm, 1999). 
The recognition versus bargaining issue - that there may 
be no link between recognising a 'bargaining agent' and 
actually bargaining with that agent - has been widely de-
bated in the 1990's. This has prompted a public policy in-
terest in the 'bargaining in good faith' notion (Anderson & 
Walsh, 1993).3 The distinction between recognition and ac-
tual bargaining could be argued as being in line with the 
freedom of choice principle and the overall market orien-
tation of employment relations under the ECA. However, 
the distinction could open for frequent; organisational based 
disputes over employee access to collective bargaining (as 
was the case in Denmark prior to the establishment of the 
Danish model around the turn of the century) (Due et al, 
1994). 
With the disappearance of award based minima, statutory 
minimum conditions have become more important under 
the ECA. This has had a major negative impact on terms 
and conditions for people in the so called secondary labour 
market (Harbridge & Street, 1995; McLaughlin & 
Rasmussen, 1998).Although this can be interpreted as the 
Act is actually working - terms and conditions are deter-
mined by market situations at enterprise level - it has 
prompted an unintentional outcome: deregulation eliciting 
public pressure for a statutory response pattern. This can 
be exemplified by the introduction of a youth minimum 
wage in 1994, the increased political focus on and subse-
quent rise in the adult minimum wage in 1996-97, the Gov-
ernment announcement of a legislative codification of trial 
periods and dismissal procedures in 1998 and finally, the 
pressure for paid parental leave in 1998. 
The ECA's extension of personal grievance entitlements 
to all employees has increased the protection and bargain-
ing power of employees; particularly those employees on 
individual employment contracts in the primary labour 
market. The effects on employment relations have been far-
reaching in terms of: employer and employee behaviour; 
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the implementation of improved human resource manage~ 
ment practices; and transaction costs. 
The positive effects of the extended personal grievance 
entitlement have included a greater employee willingness 
to challenge arbitrary and unfair management decisions. 
'This is important to recognise as the ECA generally has 
increased employer bargaining power (Armitage & Dunbar, 
1993; Whatman et al, 1994; Dannin, 1997). The possibility 
of an employee challenge to managerial decisions has been 
an incentive to implement 'best practice' human resource 
management procedures (Rasmussen et al, 1996). 
There have been, however, several negative effects associ~ 
ated with extended personal grievance entitlements. There 
has been a significant increase in the number of grievances 
taken at the Employment Tribunal, currently running at over 
5,000 cases a year (Harbridge, 1998). This has prompted 
employer claims of a growth in litigious behaviour with 
resulting negative impact on employment and economic 
efficiency. It has also spurred the Government to announce 
that it intends to further refine the ECA (Rasrnussen & 
Mclntosh, 1998: 244-5). While litigious behaviour is clearly 
problematic it must be noted that Hector & Hobby (1998) 
found that the majority of grievances were actually resolved 
informally at workplace level and that the number oftribu~ 
nal cases constituted less than four cases per thousand em~ 
ployees. 
The bargaining scenario in Denmark 
The Danish employment relations system is probably more 
non~prescriptive than the New Zealand system under the 
ECA. There is no general legislation - such as the ECA -
that covers employment relations and particularly bargain-
ing behaviour. Instead there is a heavy reliance on collec-
tive agreements which stipulate both the employment rela-
tions framework and terms and conditions. There is only 
the Salaried Employees Act (Funktiomerloven) which stipu-
lates basic employment relations entitlements for white-
collar employees and " .. .in the case of blue-collar workers, 
basic terms are almost exclusively provided for by collec-
tive agreements." (Burgess, 1991b: 25). However, a number 
of significant terms and conditions - leave, retirement, etc. 
- are set in statute by various pieces of legislation (see be-
low). 
It is a major difference between the two systems that col-
lectively agreed conditions has been prevalent for a long 
time in Denmark. The voluntaristic Danish system has his-
torically had a strong collective focus .4 Instead of legisla-
tion, the Danish model is built around two General Agree-
ments and a plethora of collective agreements specifying 
terms and conditions in particular indusnies or occupations. 
lbis arrangement has been in place since the so called 1899 
'September Compromise' although further extensions and 
refinements have been on-going to the present day (Scheuer, 
1992; Due et a!, 1994). 
"The General Agreement ( Hovedaftalen) regulates each 
party's rights of organization and association, the rec-
ognition of managerial prerogatives, the status of col-
lective agreements, unfair dismissal, and enabling pro-
visions - to be fleshed out by industry agreements - on 
shop stewards. The Co-operation Agreement 
(Samarbejdsaftalen) /. .. ../establishes a framework for 
industrial co-operation, information and consultation 
on a wide range of issues." (Burgess 1991a: 25). 
Employee 'voice' or representation is an example of the 
predominance of collective agreements. There are four main 
channels for employee representation- shop stewards, co-
operation committees, employee board directors and health 
& safety committees. Of these, the first two channels are 
the most important ones and they are founded on collec-
tive agreements (Knudsen, 1995). While employee board 
directors and the health and safety committee have impor-
tant roles they are less significant in terms of day-to-day 
employment relations and in terms of issues dealt with. 
Additionally, legislation regarding employee board direc-
tors and health and safety committees were introduced sub-
sequent to tripartite negotiations. 
The approach surrounding legislation regarding employee 
board directors is typical for development of employment 
relations legislation in Denmark. The need for legislation 
and the main issues are first established between employ~ 
ers' organisations and the unions and then legislation and 
implementation issues are dealt with in tripartite negotia-
tions. While there have been deviations from this pattern 
(see below), it is still true by the end of the 1990's that 
"Denmark still has a system with strong corporatist traits." 
(Scheuer, 1992: 193). 
The Danish membership of the European Union is increas-
ingly challenging the voluntarism of the Danish system as 
the national implementation of EU-directives is supposed 
to ensure that the entire labour market is covered by the 
regulations. While most employees are covered by collec-
tive agreements this is not the case for everybody. Thus, 
the implementation of the directives through collective 
agreements- as preferred by the trade unions, the employ-
ers ' organisations and the state- seems to be inadequate 
and legislation more appropriate. This will threaten, how-
ever, the voluntarism of the 'Danish model' (Knudsen & 
Lind, 1999). 
Another interesting example of the impact of European 
standardisation, is the issue of 'closed shop ' arrangements. 
In principle, it is possible to implement 'closed shop' ar-
rangements in the private sector. And there have been sev-
eral hotly disputed examples over the years. It is, neverthe-
less, not a major issue because of two limiting factors. Fol-
lowing a 1981 decision in the European Court of Human 
Rights, the Danish Parliament legislated that "an employer 
may not dismiss an employee for not being a union mem-
ber unless the employee knew that union membership was 
a condition of employment." (Burgess, 1991a: 33). Sec-
ondly, collective arrangements have also had an impact in 
this area since the Employers Federation (DA) prohibits its 
member companies from entering into closed shop agree-
ments and this sets the trend for the rest of the private sec-
tor labour market. 
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Although voluntarism is a cornerstone in the regulation of 
industrial relations in Denmark, the principle of 'free col-
lective bargaining' is frequently violated since the relation-
ship between the state and free collective bargaining is in 
reality very flexible. During the 1970's, direct state inter-
vention in collective bargaining took place in three out of 
the five national bargaining rounds (1975, 1977, 1979) be-
cause the government was faced with a major conflict when 
the bargaining parties could not agree (Rasmussen, 1987). 
This happened also in 1985 and 1998, but since the 1970's 
various governments have typically intervened by regulat-
ing single elements in the agreements (in 1981, 1983 and 
1991). Governments have influenced the agreements 'in-
directly ' by 'recommending' a general level of wage in-
creases followed by an implicit or explicit threat that higher 
levels would be punished by higher taxes. Finally, govern-
ments have used public sector bargaining to set a level for 
subsequent bargaining in the private sector ( 1991 and 1997). 
While it is beyond the scope of this article, it is important 
to have an in-depth understanding of the above discussed 
interaction between the labour market organisations and 
the state since it provides the Danish system with a lot of 
flexibility, economic efficiency and socially balanced out-
comes. It also makes the system rather contradictory with 
a very large role for the state in a system that is basically 
voluntaristic and with strong collective action <it both na-
tional, industry and workplace level. 
The sanctity of contract principle has been a key element 
of Danish employment relations since the 1899 'Septem-
ber Compromise'. This was further buttressed by the intro-
duction of the distinction of disputes of interest and dis-
putes of rights in 1908. This has provided for a strong role 
for the pre-dominantly bi-partite Labour Court in imple-
menting these principles. There is strong support from both 
employers and unions for these principles. The employers' 
organisations regard this as not just a way of limiting in-
dustrial disputes during the collective contract period but 
also as a way of avoiding individual employers being picked 
off by the unions. The unions consider this system as a 
cornerstone for creating a relationship based upon mutual 
trust between the unions and the employers which provides 
for incremental reforms and improvements. Thus, the prin-
ciples have been fine-tuned and further strengthened over 
the years. For example, the sanctity of contract principle 
has recently been strengthened by legislation in 1993 re-
quiring individual employment contracts to be in writing 
(Scheuer, 1996: 194). 
When it comes to recognition and bargaining, there exists 
no legislative requirement regarding recognition of 'bar~ 
gaining agents' and ('good faith') bargaining. Union ac-
tivities are protected by the freedom of association right in 
the Constitution. However, this is a general protection of 
the right to form associations (be it a bridge club or a po-
litical party) and it provides no particular protection for 
union activities. Thus, recognition and bargaining are ulti-
mately reliant on market strength in order to force the other 
side to the bargaining table. This will not be the case with 
organisations covered by the General Agreement 
(Hovedaftalen) as these organisations have already agreed 
to recognition and bargaining. However, employers out-
side the employers' organisations can resist both recogni-
tion and bargaining. And this can lead to protracted indus-
trial disputes. For example, a long-term conflict involved 
restaurants in historical Nyhavn, Copenhagen during 1996 
and 1997 (Waddington et a!, 1997). 
As stated above, legislation is important in areas of mini-
mum conditions. Tbis includes: holiday entitlements (Holi-
daysAct), parental leave entitlements- including paid leave 
(Maternity Leave Act), additional retirement payments (ATP 
Act), and sick leave entitlements (Daily Sickness Benefit 
Act). Many of these entitlements are further enhanced 
through collective agreements. This is similar to the pre-
ECA situation in New Zealand. It is noticeable, however, 
that there is no Danish statutory minimum wage. A statu-
tory minima ('garantil~n') was introduced as part of the 
1977 incomes policy intervention but this temporary meas-
ure to protect low paid workers disappeared again subse-
quent to the 1981 collective bargaining round. 
The redundancy protection is also weaker in the Danish 
system. Neither countries have any significant statutory 
requirement to pay redundancy- though it has recently been 
a topic of changing legal precedent in New Zealand 
(Rasmussen & Larnm, 1999) and Danish white-collar work-
ers are entitled to a maximum of 3 months salary after 18 
years of employment (Burgess, 199Ib). The redundancy 
concept is virtually unknown in Danish employment rela-
tions. Instead there are limited notice period requirements 
for white-collar workers according to legislation (up to 6 
months salary after 9 years of employment) and for blue-
collar workers according to collective agreements (up to 4 
months salary). 
Some would say that the generous unemployment benefit 
system in Denmark is a de facto and permanent redundancy 
payment system (90 per cent of former wages, with a maxi-
mum ofDKr 538- around NZ$150- per day).lt certainly 
reduces opposition against redundancy among many low 
paid employees if they can get 90 per cent of their former 
wages in unemployment benefits (assuming they are not 
faced with long-term unemployment). This tends to create 
a labour market with a high level of numerical flexibility 
amongst low paid employees. 
When it comes to working time regulations, New Zealand 
is clearly more deregulated than Denmark. Statutory re-
strictions on working hours are nearly non-existent in New 
Zealand, except for a general protection on grounds of 
health and safety stipulated by the Health and Safety in 
Employment Act 1992. In Denmark, there is an 11 hour 
break period prescribed by statute and European Union 
regulations may also impinge on working time regulations 
in the future. Both countries have specific regulations in 
areas such as transport. Collective agreements will stipu-
late working time limits for most Danish employees cov-
ered by these agreements. This means that Danish employ-
ees are also in this area more subject to collective regula-
tion than their colleagues in New Zealand. 
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In terms of personal grievances, the Danish situation is 
very similar to the pre-ECA situation. If a collective agree-
ment exists and the union believes that it is not respected 
by the employer (pay and other working conditions are 
lower than prescribed in the agreement), then the union 
can act on behalf of the member and take the case to the 
Labour Court if need be. However, if it cannot be related 
to a collective agreement - which means that this sort of 
work is not covered by a collective agreement- the union 
can take industrial action in order to force the employer to 
sign a collective agreement. In the case that no collective 
agreement exists and the employee believes that the em-
ployer violates the individual contract, then the employee 
or his/her union can go to the common law courts. These 
courts have often decided- in case the individual contract 
is unclear - that the employer has to respect some sort of 
average norm for working conditions (standards often set 
in a collective agreement covering similar types of work as 
that of the complainant). 
Unions: role, trends & issues 
The development of union membership in the 1990's con-
stitute one of the sharpest differences between the two coun-
tries (see Figure 1 and Appendix 1). Under the ECA, the 
unions have lost nearly half of their members and union 
density has dropped from 44.9 percent in 1989 to under 
19.2 percent in 1997. By contrast, the Danish unions have 
maintained their high level of union density; increasing from 
78 percent in 1990 to 83 percent in 1997. The Danish un-
ions have increased their membership and overall union 
density on the background of a growing workforce in the 
1990's. 
When the similarities in bargaining principles in Table 1 
are considered, this contrasting experience could be a sur-
prise. There are, however, obvious reasons for expecting 
some divergence, though maybe not such a large degree of 
Figure l, Union density(%), Denmark 
and New Zealand 
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divergence. The discussion of the bargaining principles 
showed that there is an inherent support for collective ac-
tion in the Danish model while the New Zealand model 
has no such support and even some manifest obstacles to 
collective action. This difference regarding collective ac-
tion will be further discussed in the following. 
In his seminal comparative article of union trends, Visser 
( 1981) suggests four general factors to facilitate a high level 
of union membership: 
(I) industry-wide, multi-employer bargaining 
(2) ·non-contested workplace presence 
(3) inclusive bargaining (eg. new employees) 
(4) overcoming the 'free-loader' problem 
Visser's factors are of interest as they have been used by 
Harbridge & Honeybone (1995) to evaluate the status of 
unions under the ECA. 5 Their detailed analysis of the de-
cline of unionism in the 1990's (1995: 236-246) presents 
little hope for a reversal of the fall in union density in New 
Zealand. 
"The ECA works against all four ofVisser's conditions 
for successful unionism Barriers to multi-employer bar-
gaining, failure to provide for non-contested status as 
unions, failure to allow automatic inclusive bargaining, 
and failure to allow for any 'closed shop' arrangements, 
necessarily predicate against any reversal of union de-
cline in New Zealand." 
(Harbridge & Honeybone, 1995: 246). 
On that background, it is interesting to see how the same 
four factors can explain the continuously high union den-
sity in Denmark. 
The Danish unions have succeeded in developing indus-
try-wide, multi-employer bargaining. This is manifested in 
the General Agreement (Hovedaftalen) but it is also sup-
ported by three other factors. First, recent changes amongst 
employers' organisations and unions have emphasised in-
dustry bargaining. So called 'cartel bargaining' means that 
national industry bargaining will often involve a group - a 
cartel- of unions and this tends to reduce inter-union con-
flict (Scheuer, 1992; Lind, 1999). Second, industry-wide, 
multi-employer bargaining is closely related to enterprise 
bargaining. While industry bargaining sets the parameters 
for enterprise bargaining, it is the strength at workplace 
level that ultimately underpins union demands at industry 
level. Increases in terms and conditions obtained at enter-
prise level will also subsequently feed back into industry 
negotiations. 6 Third, there is significant support for indus-
try bargaining amongst employers since it tends to reduce 
transaction costs by setting general parameters for enter-
prise bargaining. It also reduces inter-employer competi-
tion in a labour market characterised by low unemploy-
ment and strong unions. 
The ability of the Danish unions to obtain a non-contested 
institutionalised workplace presence is based, as mentioned 
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above, on the unions' historical agreement with the em~ 
players ' organisations (Due et al, 1994; Scheuer, 1992). 
The containment of inter-union disputes is, as with indus~ 
try-wide bargaining, vi tal to avoid damaging disagreements 
at workplace level (instead disagreements are solved by 
the help of the appropriate union federation). The unions' 
emphasis on employee voice or industrial democracy have 
further secured them workplace presence. This is opposite 
to the more direct bargaining approach taken by New Zea-
land unions (Rasrnussen, 1997). Finally, the union role is 
wider (see below) and the union behaviour has tradition-
ally been moderate. Thus, the negative public attitude, well-
known in New Zealand, associated with 'bloody-minded ' 
unionism and inconvenient strike activity is less prevalent. 
In a situation where the vast majority of employees are union 
members, the issue of 'inclusive bargaining ' (negotiating 
for members and non-members alike)~ becomes less im-
portant. As the union is normally party to the collective 
employment contract, the terms and conditions tend to be-
come general standards. Thus, the collective contracts will 
cover particular types of jobs rather than particular indi-
vidual employees. 7 Collective agreements also provide non~ 
unionised employees with the same working conditions if 
they work for an employer who has signed a collective 
agreement covering the kind of work these employees are 
doing. The Danish unions have also secured through the 
unemployment insurance system that the unemployed can 
continue their union membership which avoids the exclu-
siveness of the unemployed found in several other coun-
tries. Finally, the unions have constantly tried to overcome 
the traditional differences- gender, occupation and sector-
amongst union members (Scheuer, 1992: 178). Although 
the 'solidary wage policy' has become less pronounced 
amongst unions in the 1990's (Lind, 1996), a widening of 
differentials has been avoided. 
While the 'inclusiveness' issue is less important in bargain-
ing or for union strategies the same cannot be said for the 
latent propensity to 'free-load'. In a situation with high 
union density an obvious question is why should employ-
ees pay union membership if they can get many of the ben-
efits accrued by collective bargaining for free? Free-load-
ing can be rather damaging for union strength since it could 
undermine the three other above mentioned factors under-
pinning multi-employer bargaining. Besides securing sup-
port for collective action amongst employees and employ-
ers, Danish unions have relied on three other 'levers': in~ 
volvement in training and education, membership services, 
and involvement in the unemployment insurance system. 
"Thus union-controlled unemployment insurance funds 
in Denmark, Sweden, Belgium and elsewhere are seen 
as contributing eo high union density, as is the role of 
Danish unions in enforcing individual employment rights 
through the labour courts." 
(Femer & Hyman, 1992: xxiii). 
The link between high levels of union membership rates in 
Denmark, Sweden and Finland and the system of unem-
ployment insurance is worth exploring. In these countries 
the so-called Gent-system is applied, which means that 
unemployment insurance is voluntary and based on mem-
bership of unemployment funds. Thus, an employee can 
be a member of an unemployment fund without being !1 
member of a trade union. However, the unemployment 
funds have traditionally had- and in most cases still have-
a very close relationships with the unions. In Denmark, 
this is particularly so amongst the trade unions affiliated to 
the LO union federation. Formally the unions cannot com-
bine membership of an unemployment fund to trade union 
membership, but in reality they often act as if it involves 
the same organisation. In fact, many members are not aware 
of the distinction: in order to become a member of an un-
employment fund they join a trade union, and several sur-
veys have found that this constitutes one of the main rea-
sons why employees take up union membership (Lind, 
1996). 
Most Danish trade unions will also have a substantial 'pro-
fessional' role through their involvement in training and 
education. Traditionally, this has been strong amongst trades 
people and semi-skilled groups. However, it now extends 
across the whole range of trade unions and has been fur-
ther embedded by the growth of white-collar and profes-
sional union membership since the 1970's. Training pro-
grammes are often developed in unison with the relevant 
employer organisations and training and education have 
been a key element in reducing unemployment in the 1980's 
and 1990's. A particular training effort has been directed at 
shop stewards and employee representatives involved with 
co-operation committees and company boards. These train-
ing activities have generally lifted the unions' profile and 
it has generated numerous well educated and business-wise 
trade union activists. 
While the ' inclusiveness' mentioned above limits the dis-
tinction between unionised and non-unionised employees, 
union membership still confers many important benefits. 
As Femer and Hyman (1992: xxiii) point out, enforcing 
individual employment rights through the labour coun s is 
an imponant union service. Union membership provides 
an element of security - an 'insurance option' - which many 
employees find of crucial value (Scheuer, 1996 ). At the 
same time, there is a range of more customer-orientated 
services (cheap insurances, rebates, cultural activities, etc.) 
available, depending on the union involved. These benefits 
make union membership more attractive though the 'in-
surance option', training programmes and traditional af-
filiation tend to be more important when employees have 
to decide whether to keep or take up union membership. 
Conclusion 
While the statutory minimum code and legal decision-mak-
ing in the employment institutions still have a strong pres-
ence, the Employment Contracts Act has constituted a sharp 
break with the historical pattern of New Zealand employ-
ment relations. A more voluntaristic system with an indi-
vidualistic focus has developed in the 1990's. The indi-
vidualistic focus is associated with a particular understand-
ing of the freedom of association principle (more like a 
Labour; Employment and Work in New Zealand 1998 199 
200 
'freedom of disassociation') (Dannin, 1997), explicit re-
strictions on collective action and a growing employer pref-
erence for individual employment contracts. 
Danish employment relations have followed a more evolu-
tionary pattern which has kept intact a voluntaristic system 
with a collective focus. The strong position of collective 
arrangements is a form of de facto regulation which makes 
legislative arrangements less necessary. At the same time, 
the bipartite collaboration between employers and unions 
continues to be linked to tripartite, corporatist policy de-
velopment in a way which supports long-term stability and 
a flexible development of Danish employment relations. 
Focussing on the co-operative pattern of employment rela-
tions, one could argue that the Danish system of labour 
market regulation is based upon an ongoing and tacit so-
cial pact between state, capital and labour which secures a 
'responsible' and communicative behaviour amongst the 
so called 'social partners'. 
It has been argued that the two employment relations sys-
tems have converged in the 1990's with the New Zealand 
system becoming more voluntaristic and with the Danish 
system having a few more statutory entitlements. The two 
countries' employment relations systems are based on 
voluntaristic bargaining arrangements with a significant role 
for state imposed regulations in the area of contractual dis-
putes and statutory minima. However, within this predomi-
nantly voluntaristic system an overall divergence between 
an individualistic and a collective focus has become more 
pronounced. This has been particularly prevalent in areas 
such as personal grievances, employee 'voice', vocational 
training and public policy involvement. The trends in un-
ion membership in the two countries present a clear illus-
tration of such divergence. 
Finally, it has been indicated that in order to understand 
the patterns of convergence and divergence, it is necessary 
to work with more detailed and subtle analyses which take 
into account that the wider historical and political context 
is often more important than the formalised, statutory frame-
work. Employment relations are embedded in the economic, 
social and political institutions and the social relations of 
the society. 
Future research 
There is a need to further pinpoint the important similari-
ties and differences between the two employment relations 
systems. In particular, it is of interest to conduct more evalu-
ative research regarding workplace impacts of these simi-
larities and differences. For example, what are the impacts 
on workplace employment relations of a high degree (or 
absence) of collectivism and employee influence? 
The emphasis above on both the employment relations sys-
tem and the contextual factors could be developed further. 
Do employment relations systems have significant employ-
ment, productivity and flexibility effects (as initially sug-
gested by the proponents of the Employment Contracts Act) 
or is the interaction with and support of contextual factors 
- for example, training and education systems - of greater 
importance? 
Notes 
For language reasons, we have tried to restrict refer-
ences to the Danish system to references written in Eng-
lish. 
2 Although lack of awareness of contract status still ex-
ists amongst some employees (Rasmussen, 1996: Hec-
tor & Hobby, 1998) 
As known from Canadian employment relations (Clark, 
1993: 161). 
4 Typically, the sub-title of the book on the Danish model 
by Due et al 1994 refers to the Danish system of collec-
tive bargaining- see references. 
There has been an important shift towards industry level 
bargaining - what Danish commentators call 'decen-
tralisation'- in the 1980's and 1990's and this has pro-
vided the Danish system with new flexibility, new or-
ganisational patterns and new problems ( eg. Scheuer, 
1992; Lind, 1999). Discussing this shift is, however, 
beyond this article. 
See Harbridge & Honey bone ( 1995: 236) for a succinct 
presentation of Visser's four factors. 
For sake of simplicity, we here 'overlook' complica-
tions caused by the traditional occupational basis of 
many union and instances of insufficient workplace 
presence (eg. Scheuer, 1996). We will discuss these com-
plications in a later comparative article since they have 
had an important impact on New Zealand unionism. 
This difference is of major importance, as stressed by 
Dannin ( 1997: 304) in her criticism of the ECA. 
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